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MOVING VIOLATIONS: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE BROAD PREEMPTIVE EFFECT
OF THE CARMACK AMENDMENT
JEANNE KAISER

*

INTRODUCTION

On August 28, 1990, the day after she moved from Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina to Northampton, Massachusetts, Jane Rini
woke up and began unpacking her household belongings which had
been transported to her new home by United Van Lines
("United"). When she opened a box that United's packers had la
beled with the title "artwork," she discovered it was empty. Later
in the day, she discovered that another box, labeled by the packers
as "Orange Box 77" and designated by them as containing artwork,
was not in her new home. When all of the boxes were unpacked,
Ms. Rini discovered that eleven pieces of valuable art that had been
in her family for generations were missing. 1
United never located Ms. Rini's lost artwork; in fact, it appar
ently never looked for it. United also denied Ms. Rini any financial

* Lawyering Process Instructor, Western New England College School of Law.
J.D., 1993, Western New England College School of Law; M.S., 1985, B.A., 1976, State
University of New York at Buffalo. The author was an associate at the Northhampton,
Massachusetts firm of Fierst and Pucci, and assisted in writing the appellate brief for the
plaintiff in Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
51 (1997).
1. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (D. Mass. 1995),
rev'd, 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997).
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compensation whatsoever for losing her valuable belongings. 2 Ms.
Rini followed United's procedure for filing a claim, but the com
pany denied it in its entirety.3 Throughout the claims process, and
the ensuing trial, United asserted multiple and conflicting defenses.
First, it suggested that Ms. Rini never provided the company
with her artwork before she moved. 4 United then contended that
even if it had received the artwork, it had delivered it to Ms. Rini in
her Northampton home. 5 Next, United claimed that it was immate
rial whether or not it lost the artwork, because Ms. Rini could not
prove how much the items were worth since she had no receipts for
objects that had been in her family for generations. 6 United rea
soned that since Ms. Rini could not prove the worth of the lost
items with exactitude, she was not entitled to compensation. 7 Fi
nally, when Ms. Rini submitted photographs of the missing items to
professional art appraisers, who placed a value on all of the missing
items, United again rejected her claim altogether, stating that it did
not accept appraisals based on photographs. 8
In December of 1992, after almost two and a half years of
fighting with United to no avail, Ms. Rini brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.9 After a
trial in which United "offer[ed] any argument theoretically avail
able, regardless of its basis in fact,"10 a jury awarded her $50,000 to
compensate her for the artwork whose value United said was im
possible to assess.!1 The jury also awarded Ms. Rini $100,000 to
compensate her for the injuries she suffered as a result of United's
negligence and misrepresentations during the two and a half year
claims process.!2 Characterizing United's behavior during the
2. See id. at 228.
3. See id. at 227-28.
4. See id. at 230.
5. See id. at 228, 230.
6. See id. at 227,230.
7. See id. at 227 (explaining that United's demands for documentation were a
deliberate "sham to justify denial of a valid claim").
8. See id. at 227, 230.
9. See id. at 229. United tried to thwart Ms. Rini's lawsuit before it began by
bringing a Declaratory Judgment Action in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina before she filed suit in Massachusetts. United's suit was
dismissed by the district court in South Carolina as an improper use of the Declaratory
Judgment Act. See id.
10. Id. It should be noted that the defenses asserted by United during the claims
process were reasserted at trial. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of these defenses.
11. See Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 231.
12. See id.
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claims process as "a sham designed to wear plaintiff down and force
her to abandon a legitimate claim,"13 the trial judge found for Ms.
Rini on her claim under chapter 93A of the General Laws of Mas
sachusetts14 and tripled her damages. 15 He also awarded attorneys'
fees and costs, resulting in a total judgment of $504,309.1 6
Ms. Rini's period of vindication was short. Upon appeal by
United, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
determined that all of Ms. Rini's common law and state statutory
claims were preempted by a federal statute commonly known as the
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.17 The
court found that Ms. Rini's only remedy against United was com
pensation for the actual value of her missing items. Thus, Ms.
Rini's recovery was limited to the $50,000 the jury determined her
artwork was worth, the same amount that she was owed on the day
she first filed her administrative claim with United in 1990. 18
In so deciding, the First Circuit aligned itself with other circuit
courts that have considered the matter of Carmack preemption. 19
As a result of the uniform decisions of the circuit courts on this
matter, the moving industry in the United States has immunity for
any deceptive, careless, or deliberately dishonest acts in which it
chooses to engage. No matter how egregious the behavior of a
moving company in processing a consumer's claim, the company's
13. Id. at 232.
14. Section 2 of chapter 93A bars parties doing business in Massachusetts from
engaging in unfair and deceptive acts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (1996). Sec
tion 9 of chapter 93A provides remedies for consumers victimized by such acts, includ
ing recovering of double or treble damages. See id. § 9. Chapter 93A claims are
equitable in nature and are resolved by the court, not a jury. See W. Oliver Tripp Co. v.
American Hoeschst Corp., 616 N.E.2d 118, 125 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
15. See Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 233.
16. See id. at 239.
17. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 51 (1997). In 1926, the Carmack Amendment became codified at 49 U.S.c.
§ 20(11). At the time of Ms. Rini's claim, it was codified at 49 U.S.c. §§ 10103, 10730
and 11707. In late 1995, Congress passed legislation abolishing the Interstate Com
merce Commission as of January 1, 1996. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-88, 109 Stat. 804 (1995). Under the new legislation, the Surface Transportation
Board has jurisdiction over carriers of household goods. See 49 U.S.c. § 702 (Supp. I.
1995). The issues presented in the Rini case remain vital because the new legislation
preserves the Carmack Amendment in the same form as the prior legislation. See 49
U.S.c. § 14706(a), (f) (Supp. I. 1995).
18. Since the trial judge also determined that Ms. Rini was entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees, pursuant to provisions of the Carmack Amendment, see Rini, 903 F.
Supp. at 236, Ms. Rini will also be entitled to that portion of her fees that is attributable
to her recovery under the Carmack Amendment.
19. See cases cited infra note 24.
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liability will be limited to the actual value of the lost or missing
items.
This Article addresses both the underpinnings and the merits
of this outcome. After discussing the general principles of preemp
tion, Part I describes the history, purpose and language of the Car
mack Amendment and demonstrates that at the time the
amendment was passed, Congress had no intention of preempting
claims based on moving industry misconduct such as occurred in
Ms. Rini's case. Part II discusses the constitutional principles that
govern application of the law of federal preemption and describes
how application of preemption in Carmack Amendment cases has
diverged from the overall application of preemption principles in
other areas of congressional legislation. This section views Rini in
context with the overall view of preemption law taken by the courts
in similar situations. Finally, Part III argues that the courts have
improperly granted the moving industry carte blanche to deceive
and mistreat consumers without consequence, and suggests con
gressional action to solve this problem.
I.

HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND LANGUAGE OF THE
CARMACK AMENDMENT

At the time that Ms. Rini moved from South Carolina to Mas
sachusetts, the Carmack Amendment consisted of the following
three provisions: 20
A common carrier providing transportation or service subject. to
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission ... shall
issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for trans
20. When the Carmack Amendment was passed in 1906, it read, in relevant part,
as follows:
That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving prop
erty for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State
shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful
holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or
by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such
property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass,
and no contract receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier,
railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Pro
vided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or
bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.
Interstate Commerce Regulations, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593,595 (1906) (codified with
some differences in language at 49 V.S.c. § 20(11) (1926)) (repealed 1978). Section
20(11) was repealed in 1978 by Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1466, but the Inter
state Commerce Act was reenacted as positive law by the same statute. See Interstate
Commerce Act and Related Laws, Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978).
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portation .... That carrier ... [is] liable to the person entitled to
recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed
under the paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the prop
erty ....21
The Interstate Commerce Commission may require or authorize
a carrier ... providing transportation or service subject to its ju
risdiction . . . to establish rates for transportation of property
under which the liability of the carrier for that property is limited
to a value established by written declaration of the shipper, or by
written agreement, when that value would be reasonable under
.the circumstances surrounding the transportation. 22
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the remedies pro
vided under this subtitle are in addition to remedies existing
under another law or at common law. 23
It is evident from the language of the statute, that interstate
carriers were required to issue a bill of lading when accepting goods
for transportation and that if the goods were lost or damaged in the
course of transportation, the initial carrier was responsible for com
pensating the shipper in the amount of the actual value of the
goods, unless the parties had agreed to limit liability. Ms. Rini, in
her lawsuit, asserted claims not just for the loss of her goods, but for
the emotional injuries she endured as a result of the protracted and
futile claims process with United. Thus, the essential question for
the Rini court, as well as other federal courts of appeal that had
considered similar cases,24 was whether state common law and stat
utory claims that relate to injuries separate and distinct from the
actual loss of goods were preempted by the federal statute outlined
above.
.

A.

Principles of Preemption

The basic principles of federal preemption are well settled.
"Consideration under the Supremacy Clause [of the United States
Constitution] starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not
intend to displace state law."25 State law is paramount, unless, and
21. 49 u.~c. § 11707(a)(1) (1994).
22. Id. § 10730(a).
23. Id. § 10103.
24. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1994); Moffit
v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1993); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. North Am.
Van Lines, Inc., 970 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d
1407 (7th Cir. 1987); W.D. Lawson & Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 456 F.2d 419 (6th Cir.
1972).
25. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
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only to the extent that, Congress unmistakably expresses its intent
to usurp it. 26 "[T]he historic police powers of the States [are] not to
be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and mani
fest purpose of Congress."27
In the absence of express congressional command, state law is
preempted only when Congress evidences an intent to exclude it by
legislating so pervasively on a subject that it occupies the field and
leaves no room for state regulation or when state law conflicts di
rectly with federal law, making it impossible to comply with both. 28
"[F]or a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have
some direct and substantial effect" on the area that Congress
sought to regulate. 29
There is no explicit preemption provision in the Carmack
Amendment. 3D Indeed, the only reference to state law contained in
the text of the Carmack Amendment is the proviso that "[e ]xcept as
otherwise provided in this subtitle, the remedies provided under
this subtitle are in addition to remedies existing under another law
or at common law."31 Thus, shippers should be entitled to state
common law and statutory remedies for injuries separate and apart
from the loss of their goods, unless, despite including this savings
clause, Congress "clear[ly] and manifest[ly]" expressed its intent to
supersede these claims by either entirely occupying the field of
shipper-carrier relations or by creating a direct clash between state
and federallaw. 32
B.

Congressional Intent Behind the Carmack Amendment

When the Carmack Amendment was enacted by Congress in
1906, it was not accompanied by any legislative history.33 Nonethe
less, Congress's intent may be gleaned from an examination of the
text and decided United States Supreme Court cases surrounding
its enactment. These sources support the conclusion that Congress
intended to resolve specific difficulties that had arisen in the arena
of interstate transit of goods due to the existence of diverse state
26. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
27. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
28. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
29. Id. at 85.
30. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
31. 49 U.S.c. § 10103 (1994).
32. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
33. See 40 CONGo REc. 7075 (1906) (indicating that no committee considered the
amendment).
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laws. These laws, however, had nothing to do with shipper com
plaints of carrier misconduct in the claims process or any other as
pect of the shipper-carrier relationship.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Hughes ,34 decided three years before
the enactment of the Carmack Amendment, involved a contract be
tween a shipper and a railroad carrier for shipment of a horse. The
shipper agreed that in exchange for a reduced rate of shipment, the
carrier would be responsible for only a limited monetary loss if the
horse was lost or damaged in transit. This agreement was valid
under the laws of New York, where it was made. However, the
horse was destined for Pennsylvania, a state that did not enforce
contractual limitations on liability because of its internal public pol
icy. The shipper sued successfully in Pennsylvania for the full value
of his horse, which was injured on the railroad tracks after arriving
in Philadelphia. 35
In the United States Supreme Court, the carrier objected that
such state interference in its practices was a violation of the Inter
state Commerce Act. The Court disagreed, declaring that while the
Act covered many areas of interstate commerce, Congress had not
legislated on the precise matter in controversy.36 Since Congress
had not expressed any intention with respect to the validity of con
tracts between shippers and carriers to limit carrier liability for loss
or damage to goods, the Court held that state law remained control
ling. Consequently, the shipper in Hughes was permitted to recover
the full amount of his loss resulting from the injury to his horse
pursuant to Pennsylvania law, despite the previously agreed to limi
tation. 37 The Court invited a congressional response to its opinion
in Hughes by noting the absence of legislation on the matter. 38
Three years later, Congress took up the invitation and passed
the Carmack AmendmenP9 The amendment provided a federal
scheme of carrier liability for goods lost or damaged in interstate
transit by placing responsibility for the goods with the initial carrier
and by providing that the terms of the bill of lading issued by the
initial carrier controlled the transaction. 40
34. 191 U.S. 477 (1903).
35. See id. at 478-80.
36. See id. at 488.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 49l.
39. Interstate Commerce Regulations, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593, 595 (1906) (re
pealed 1978). See supra note 20 for original text of the amendment.
40. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 504 (1913) (defining the
"significant and dominating features" of the Carmack Amendment).
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This legislation was a direct response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hughes, which had continued the uncertainty regarding
the validity of contractual limitations on liability depending on
where a shipment originated and its final destination. This interpre
tation of the amendment was confirmed in the first case to examine
it in detail, Adams Express Co. v. Croninger. 41
Adams Express Co. involved a bill of lading "in all essentials
identical" to the one at issue in Hughes .42 In Adams Express Co.,
the shipper of a diamond ring lost in transit attempted to recover
the full value of the ring, although he had previously contracted to
limit the carrier's liability for the ring to fifty dollars in exchange for
a lower shipping COSt. 43 The shipper relied on Kentucky's common
law permitting him to recover the full amount of his loss despite the
contractual agreement contained in the bill of lading. 44 The Court
determined that the rule of law announced in Hughes, that would
have permitted the shipper's full recovery, was superseded by pas
sage of the Carmack Amendment. 45
Congress, it reasoned, had responded to the Hughes Court's
invitation to legislate with respect to this precise issue. Congress
demonstrated its intent to eliminate the confusion resulting from
conflicting state laws regarding limited liability contracts by provid
ing that the terms of the initial carrier's bill of lading would control
recovery on the shipment. While Congress did not explicitly an
nounce its intent to usurp state law on the issue, the Adams Express
Co. Court found that it implicitly did so by announcing a uniform
policy on the subject. 46 The Court, quoting the Georgia Court of
Appeals, noted the difficulties created by the policy perpetuated in
the Hughes decision:
Some States allowed carriers to exempt themselves from all or a
part of the common law liability, by rule, regulation, or contract;
others did not; the Federal courts sitting in the various States
were following the local rule, a carrier being held liable in one
court when under the same state of facts he would be exempt
from liability in another; hence this branch of interstate com
merce was being subjected to such a diversity of legislative and
judicial holding that it was practically impossible for a shipper
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

226 U.S. 491 (1913).
/d. at 501.
See id. at 492-93.
See id. at 497-98.
See id. at 505.
See id. at 505-06.
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engaged in a business that extended beyond the confines of his
own State, or for a carrier whose lines were extensive, to know
without considerable investigation and trouble, and even then
oftentimes with but little certainty, what would be the carrier's
actual responsibility as to goods delivered to it for transportation
from one State to another. 47

The Court held that Congress intended to eliminate this confu
sion by passing the Carmack Amendment. Immediately following
the foregoing passage, the Court stated the following:
That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies of
a particular State upon the same subject results from its general
character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier
under a bill of lading which he must issue and limits his power to
exempt himself by rule, regulation or contract. Almost every de
tail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no
rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of
the subject and supersede all state regulation with reference to
it. 48

From the standpoint of modern day shippers like Ms. Rini, the
essential question is the scope of "the subject" referred to by the
Adams Express Co. Court. The most reasonable reading of the
words, in the context of the decision, is that they refer to the en
forceability of a contract between a shipper and a carrier which lim
its the carrier's liability for loss of goods in exchange for a lower
shipping cost. There is no indication that the Adams Express Co.
Court was referring to any other aspect of the shipper-carrier rela
tionship, particularly not the post-loss claims process.
C.

Application of Preemption Principles to Carmack Cases

Cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the years
immediately following passage of the Carmack Amendment did lit
tle to clarify the scope of "the subject" referred to in the Adams
Express Co. decision. In 1914, in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway
Co. v. Harris ,49 the Court reviewed a Texas statute that allowed
shippers who sue to recover damages under a bill of lading, to col
lect attorneys' fees from the carrier as wel1. 50 The Harris Court
47.
(1909)).
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 505 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw, 5 Ga. App. 675, 687
Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
234 U.S. 412 (1914).
See id. at 415. Demonstrating a sign of changed times, the attorneys' fees
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rejected the argument that state statutes permitting recovery of at
torneys' fees were now preempted by the Carmack Amendment,
reasoning that statutes did not "enlarge or limit the responsibility of
the carrier for the loss of property entrusted to it in transporta
tion."51 The Harris Court remarked that Congress had not acted
on the question of entitlement to attorneys' fees when goods were
lost or damaged in interstate commerce, and that unless and until
Congress acted, state law on the matter was enforceable. 52 The
message of the Harris Court, thus appeared to be that the Carmack
Amendment preempted only state laws that specifically addressed
the issue of the amount of recovery shippers were entitled to for the
loss of their goods and the ability of shippers and carriers to limit
the carrier's liability for such loss by contract. On the other hand,
the Harris Court indicated, state laws that allow recovery for losses
sustained by shippers in addition to the loss of their goods remained
valid exercises of state power. 53
Nonetheless, a case decided the very next year by the United
States Supreme Court muddied this message considerably. Charles
ton & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co. 54 in
volved a South Carolina statute that imposed a fifty dollar penalty
on carriers that failed to pay legitimate claims for loss or damage to
goods within forty days.55 The Varnville Court determined that this
statute, which presumably was intended to compensate shippers for
the inconvenience related to the carriers' delay in resolving their
claims, was preempted by the Carmack Amendment. The Court
found the statute to be preempted because the state policy, how
ever well conceived, went further than Congress intended. The
Varnville Court said the following of the South Carolina statute:
The state law was not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress,
but to enforce a state policy differently conceived; and the fine of
$50 is enough to constitute a burden. . . . But that is immaterial.
awarded in this case were only ten dollars. Nonetheless, this recovery was over three
times the amount of the shipper's actual damages of three dollars. See id.
51. Id. at 420.
52. See id. at 422. Congress later acted on the issue of attorneys' fees under the
Carmack Amendment in cases involving shippers of household goods. See 49 U.S.c.
§ 11711(d) (1994). However, because Congress never legislated on the matter of attor
neys' fees in cases involving commercial shippers, state laws providing for awards of
attorneys' fees are enforceable in those Carmack cases. See A.T. Clayton & Co. v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 901 F.2d 833, 835 (10th Cir. 1990).
53. See Harris, 234 U.S. at 420.
54. 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
55. See id. at 600-01.
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When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand
coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not
to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Con
gress has seen fit to gO.56

This language might be interpreted as holding that any state
statute enhancing the recovery of shippers beyond the value of their
lost or damaged goods was preempted by the Carmack Amend
ment; however, the Varnville Court emphasized the continued vital
ity of the Harris decision. 57 In so doing, the Varnville Court
indicated that the problem with the South Carolina statute was not
that it increased the shipper's recovery for an injury separate from
the loss of property, but that it conflicted with the overall scheme of
recovery set forth in the Carmack Amendment.
The South Carolina statute involved in Varnville was more
comprehensive than the Texas statute reviewed in Harris. It im
posed upon all carriers the burden of identifying which carrier had
lost or damaged a shipper's goods within forty days, or to pay the
claim itself. If a carrier failed to either identify the responsible car
rier or pay the claim within forty days, the carrier was liable to the
shipper for the fifty dollar penalty.58 This procedure conflicts with
the one set forth in the Carmack Amendment, which places respon
sibility for the shipment squarely on the initial carrier. 59
The Carmack Amendment, and the Supreme Court cases that
were decided in the years immediately following its passage, obvi
ously preceded the advent of the consumer protection legislation
that spread throughout the United States in the latter part of this
century.60 This legislation heightened consumer expectations that
businesses would deal with consumers in a fair and equitable man
ner, or face consequences through litigation. Not surprisingly, in
recent years, the moving industry found itself faced with claims
based on both state consumer protection legislation and common
law theories of recovery for related acts. However, the moving in
dustry has been successful in asserting the Carmack Amendment as
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
See id. at 603.
See id. at 600-01.
See 49 U.S.c. § 11707 (1994).
See generally MICHAEL C. GILLERAN, THE LAW OF CHAPTER 93A, THE MAS·

SACHUSElTS CONSUMER AND BUSINESS PROTEcrION Acr § 1.1 (1989). Gilleran notes
a "sea change" in standards of commercial liability and remarks that every state now
has a consumer protection law similar to chapter 93A of the General Laws of Massa
chusetts. See id. at 4.
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a shield to such suitS.61
Prior to Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc. ,62 most cases addressing
the issue of Carmack preemption involved shippers attempting to
recover damages for carrier negligence during the course of trans
port. 63 Consequently, there was little authority governing the dis
position of common law claims based on carrier wrongdoing during
the course of processing claims. Trial court decisions in the District
of Massachusetts, however, allowed for state law remedies to con
sumers who suffered injuries separate from the loss or damage to
their goods.64
The Rini decision ended that trend with a definitive statement
61. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1994);
Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1993); Schultz v. Auld, 848 F.
Supp. 1497,1506 (D. Idaho 1993); Suarez v. United Van Lines, 791 F. Supp. 815, 817 (D.
Colo. 1992); Magetson v. United Van Lines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 917, 922 (D.N.M. 1991);
Pierre v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1149, 1150-51 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
62. 903 F. Supp. 224, 231 (D. Mass. 1995), rev'd, 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997).
63. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 970 F.2d 609, 613
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs could not assert a state law negligence claim for
damaged goods when the driver of a moving van fell asleep on the road); Hughes v.
United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff's com
mon law claims for goods destroyed in a fire on a moving van were preempted); see also
Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. North Am. Van Lines, 890 F.2d 1112, 1120 (10th
Cir. 1989) (preempting state law claims for loss or damage to goods); Hopper Furs, Inc.
v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 749 F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1984) (preempting state law
claims); W.D. Lawson & Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 456 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 1972) (pre
empting state law claims); ct. Beltman, 30 F.3d at 380 (finding that federal common law
claim for breach of the contractual obligation of fair dealing was preempted based on
carrier misconduct during the claims process); Moffit, 6 F.3d at 307 (denying common
law remedy for late delivery of goods).
64. The district court decision in Rini allowed Ms. Rini to recover on her state
law claims because "[t]he Carmack Amendment only provides a remedy for damages
arising from the loss of goods during transport," and Ms. Rini's state law claims "were
based on alleged misconduct by United not undertaken in the course of transporting
goods." Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 231. In addition, two other trial court decisions in the
District agreed with this reasoning. In Sokhos v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 691 F. Supp.
1578 (D. Mass. 1988), the court allowed the plaintiff to recover on state law causes of
action for the mover's late delivery of her belongings and subsequent uncooperative
ness during the claims process. See id. at 1579-81. Similarly, in Mesta v. Allied Van
Lines International, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 63 (D. Mass. 1988), the court, although finding
that the plaintiff's claims for negligence during the transport were preempted by the
Carmack Amendment, allowed recovery for intransigence during the claims process
under chapter 93A of the General Laws of Massachusetts. See id. at 64-65. Prior to
explicitly considering the issue in Rini, the First Circuit implied that it agreed with the
distinction made by the Rini, Sokhos, and Mesta courts by allowing a plaintiff's recov
ery on state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of con
tract to stand, despite the carrier's contention that such claims were preempted by the
Carmack Amendment. See Fredette v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 66 F.3d 369 (1st Cir.
1995).
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from the First Circuit on the issue of Carmack preemption. The
Rini court determined that any claiin "based on the loss or damage
[to] goods" was preempted. 65 In so deciding, the Rini court ac
knowledged that there was no legislative history available to steer
its inquiry regarding the intent of Congress to preempt state law
claims. 66 It also recognized that previous Supreme Court cases did
not provide clear guidance on the preemptive reach of the Carmack
Amendment. 67 Nonetheless, the Rini court gleaned congressional
intent to preempt state law remedies from its interpretation of the
purpose of the statute and the existence of procedural regulations
governing the claims process. 68 It also cited the desirability of uni
formity within the interstate moving industry as a rationale for its
decision. 69
With the First Circuit decision, consumers now face a virtually
insurmountable barrier when they suffer mistreatment at the hand
of carriers during the claims process. From a consumer protection
standpoint, this is an unfortunate development because the moving
industry is now free to deny the legitimate claims of consumers in
the hopes that they will ultimately abandon them. The carrier may
remain comfortable in the knowledge that if consumers persist in
pressing claims, they will only, under the Carmack Amendment, be
entitled to recover the amount owed at the start of the claims pro
cessJo From the standpoint of legal analysis, the Rini decision is
unfortunate because it conflicts substantially with well settled con
stitutional principles governing federal preemption of state law
remedies.
65. Rini, 104 F.3d at 506. The Rini court stated, however, that "liability arising
from separate harms-apart from the loss or damage to goods-is not preempted." [d.
The court stated that such liability might arise from a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but did not specify whether such a claim was preempted if it arose
from infliction of distress during the claims process. See id. One might expect that
plaintiffs in Ms. Rini's position will in the future assert claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress on the theory that these claims remain redress able under state law.
66. See id. at 504.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 505.
69. See id. at 507. Regulations governing interstate carriers with regards to the
procedural requirements for filing and settling claims are set forth at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1005
(1997).
70. This is not an unrealistic fear. The factual background of Rini and other Car
mack preemption cases reflect periodic unscrupulousness by the moving industry in
resolving consumer claims. See cases cited supra note 24; see also Andrea Adelson,
Boxing Up a Life and Moving Requires Caution and Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at
F8 (describing the difficulties and abuse shippers of household goods can encounter
when submitting a claim).
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THE MISAPPLICATION OF CARMACK PREEMPTION

Comparison of Preemption Principles as Applied to
Non-Carmack Cases

As set forth above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that state common law and statutory remedies remain available, de
spite the existence of federal legislation in a related area, unless
Congress has made its intent to preempt clear and manifest.7 1 By
joining other circuits to preclude recovery on Ms. Rini's state law
claims, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit as
sured that disputes between shippers and carriers of household
goods will be decided in a manner that does not give proper defer
ence to the constitutional presumption against preemption.
It is unquestionable that a circumscribed preemption of state
law can be inferred from the provision of the Carmack Amendment
that fixes a carrier's liability for loss or damage of goods to their
actual value or the declared value of the shipper.72 However, the
Rini court extended this implicit preemption to bar recovery for all
injuries that might be incurred during the course of the shipper
carrier relationship, even when those injuries are separate and dis
tinct from the loss of goods. Ms. Rini incurred damages during the
course of a claims process that the trial court found to be egre
giously unfair and abusive.?3 Despite the Supreme Court's many
admonitions that state law is not preempted unless Congress has
made its intention to do so absolutely clear,74 the First Circuit in
ferred preemption of Ms. Rini's state law remedies for this mis
treatment in the absence of any meaningful evidence of
congressional intent to preempt.
The text of the Carmack AmendmenF5 establishes that the leg
islation regulates three areas. First, it mandates the initial carrier to
compensate the shipper if goods are lost or damaged in transit.76
Second, it provides that the shipper and carrier can contract to limit
71. See supra Part I.A.
72. See 49 U.S.C. § 11707(a)(1) (1994). See supra text accompanying notes 21-23
for the entire text of the Carmack Amendment.
73. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 224, 227-30 (D. Mass. 1995),
rev'd, 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997). For a discussion of the
abusive claims process, see supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's stance on preemption.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
76. See 49 U.S.c. § 11707 (1994). It should be noted that the language of the
Carmack Amendment is no longer codified within § 11707. However, see supra note 17
for a discussion of the continued relevance of the Carmack Amendment.
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the carrier's liability for lost or damaged goods to a declared
value. 77 Third, it prescribes the remedy available for lost or dam
aged goods when no contractual limitation on liability exists or
when the contract has been improperly formed. 78 State law regula
tion on these points is preempted. 79
However, it is a great leap to assume that by regulating these
three areas Congress intended to sweepingly obliterate claims for
separate injuries such as Ms. Rini's. Examination of other field pre
emption cases teaches that courts should carefully examine the ex
tent of the field occupied and evidence of congressional intention to
preempt the particular state law claim at issue before inferring the
existence of preemption. 80 State law must have "some direct and
substantial effect" on the subject of congressional legislation to sup
port a finding of preemption. 81
This is true even when Congress has enacted complex and
comprehensive legislation regarding subjects requiring substantial
regulation and uniformity. For instance, in Silkwood v. Kerr-Mc
Gee Corp. ,82 the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended
to occupy the field of nuclear safety and oust all state law regulation
in that area. 83 However, the Court determined that Congress did
not intend to preclude all state law remedies, including punitive
damages, for individuals who suffered radiation injuries, even
though the award of such damages could conceivably have some
impact on nuclear safety decisions. 84 The Court noted that Con
gress was silent on this issue when enacting and amending the
Atomic Energy Act and that it could not assume that Congress in
tended to preempt state law remedies without comment. 85
77. See id. § 10730(a). Although the Carmack Amendment is no longer codified
within § 10730, see supra note 17 for a discussion of the amendment's continued
relevance.
78. See id. § 11707. Although the Carmack Amendment is no longer codified
within § 11707, see supra note 17 for a discussion of the amendment's continued
relevance.
79. See New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128,131
(1953) ("With the enactment in 1906 of the Carmack Amendment, Congress [estab
lished] a nationally uniform policy governing interstate carriers' liability for property
/oss." (emphasis added)); Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1913).
80. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-86 (1996); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Silkwood v, Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U,S.
238, 248 (1984),
81. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990).
82. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
83. See id. at 250.
84. See id. at 251-52.
85. See id. at 251. Specifically, the Court stated that congressional silence on the
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Most recently, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,86 the Supreme Court
held that a comprehensive federal statute governing the regulation
of medical devices did not preempt state law product liability
claims. Despite the existence of substantial federal control over
marketing and development of medical devices, the Court noted
that preemption of such claims would have "the perverse effect of
granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire
industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent
regulation in order 'to provide for the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices intended for human use.' "87
Cases from the federal courts of appeals also demonstrate that
courts should carefully parse federal statutes for evidence of con
gressional intent to preempt. This should be done in order to avoid
applying preemption principles to matters that Congress failed to
address. For example, in Tousley v. North American Van Lines,
Inc. ,88 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
examined the interplay between a state statute governing pre-con
tract negotiations between a lessor and a motor carrier, and the
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act governing formation of
a motor carrier's lease agreement. 89 The South Carolina statute at
issue placed a number of requirements on entrepreneurs selling
business opportunities, and had the "obvious purpose of . . .
alert[ing] South Carolina citizens to the possibility that investments
in business ventures may be ill-conceived and to provide some pro
tection from unscrupulous promoters. "90 The Fourth Circuit deter
mined that while the Interstate Commerce Act addressed the issue
of contract formation between motor carrier lessors and lessees, it
did not address the pre-contract behavior governed by the South
Carolina statute.91 Although the Interstate Commerce Commission
stated, when adopting the regulations at issue, that it was leaving
'" [l]essors and lessees ... completely free to bargain at arm's length
and negotiate the sale or rental of any products, equipment, or serv
ices,'" the Tousley court did not find that this rose to the level of
issue "takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal
remedy for persons injured by [tortious] conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by
illegal conduct." [d.
86. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
87. !d. at 487.
88. 752 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1985).
89. See id. at 103.
90. [d. at 100.
91. See id. at 101.
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the "clear and manifest" expression of congressional intent neces
sary for a finding of preemption of state law governing contract ne
gotiations. 92 Under those circumstances, the court found that
South Carolina retained the right to legislate in this area. The
Tousley court also noted that the two statutes served the same pur
pose of assuring fairness in the relationship of carriers and lessors,
and therefore complemented each other. 93
Before deciding Rini, the First Circuit applied a similarly care
ful analysis to a preemption case. In Schafer v. American Cyanamid
Co. ,94 the court determined that a comprehensive federal statute
governing remedies for vaccine-related injuries did not specifically
address the question of loss of consortium claims for family mem
bers of those injured by vaccines. 95 In that case, the First Circuit
would not infer congressional intent to preempt state law claims for
such losses, despite the strong federal interest in limiting the liabil
ity of vaccine manufacturers so they would continue making this
important product. 96 In his concurring opinion, Judge Stahl stated
that this conclusion was unavoidable because of the court's "cir
cumscribed scope of ... authority," but encouraged Congress to act
if it did not concur in the result. 97
When the analysis employed in these cases is applied to the
dispute between Ms. Rini and United, it seems evident that the
Carmack Amendment should not have preempted Ms. Rini's state
law claims. The Carmack Amendment says nothing about injuries
inflicted by carriers on shippers that are separate and distinct from
the loss of goods, or even about the claims process itself.98 This
should have prevented a finding of preemption iJ;l Rini, because as
the First Circuit itself stated, a congressional act should not be read
to preempt state law through silence. 99 Preemption is particularly
counter-indicated when, as here, "the state law at issue creates a
remedy unavailable under federallaw."loo
There is no legislative history supporting the conclusion that
92. Id. at 102.
93. See id.
94. 20 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
95. See id. at 7.
96. See id. at 6-7. In fact, the court stated that "[p]re-emption law ... cautions us
against finding that a congressional act pre-empts a state law through silence." [d. at 6.
97. Id. at 7 (Stahl, J., concurring).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
99. See Schafer, 20 F.3d at 6.
100. Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
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Congress intended to preempt state law claims like Ms. Rini's,l°l In
fact, the existing history indicates that Congress aimed to resolve
entirely different problems through enactment of the Carmack
Amendment. 102 Without the availability of state law remedies, Ms.
Rini was left with no judicial recourse for the injuries she suffered
during the claims process. Under these circumstances, there does
not appear to be a "clear and manifest" intent to preempt state
law,l03

B.

Preservation of Uniformity

The Rini court cited the desirability of uniformity for carriers
as a factor in its decision that Ms. Rini's state law claims were pre
empted. 104 However, for the uniformity argument to support a
finding of preemption, the court must determine that either it is
impossible to comply with both state and federal law or that state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
of Congress. lOS
The text of the Carmack Amendment fully reveals the extent
of the uniformity Congress sought when it enacted the legislation.
Congress intended that shippers whose goods were lost in transit
should not have to track down which of several interstate carriers
lost them in order to recover for their loss. It also intended to per
mit carriers to contract to limit liability, despite state law to the
contrary. In addition, it intended that, in the absence of a properly
formed contractual limit on liability, shippers should be allowed to
recover for the actual loss of their goodS. 106
The Rini decision has transformed the uniformity created over
the regulated areas of the Carmack Amendment into complete im
munity for anything that occurs in the course of the shipper-carrier
relationship. Certainly, if Congress had intended this result, it
would have said SO.107
101. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
104. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 505 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 51 (1997); see also Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir.
1994) (noting the importance of the Carmack Amendment in preserving uniformity for
interstate carriers).
105. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
107. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,487, 491 (1996); see also English,
496 U.S. at 83 (remarking that Congress could not have intended to preempt state law
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims when the implication would be that an
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In Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harris,108 the

Supreme Court made clear that the uniformity sought by Congress
when it enacted the Carmack Amendment was not a barrier to en
forcing any and all state laws in some way related to interstate ship
ment of household goods. In Harris, the Court held that states
were free to enact general legislation to compensate shippers for
damages they incurred as a result of carrier recalcitrance, because
this did not interfere with the federal scheme.1 09 Similarly, allowing
shippers to recover for abusive claims processes would not interfere
with the federal scheme governing recovery for the loss of goods.
This is particularly true since carriers are uniquely able to avoid the
liability that follows from acts involved in cases like Rini. Carriers
can avoid the unpredictability related to state law claims by resolv
ing shippers' claims fairly and expeditiously. Unfortunately, unsus
pecting shippers cannot so easily avoid injuries like the ones
suffered by Ms. Rini. In any event, it is reasonable to assume that if
Congress intended to grant carrier immunity for misconduct during
the claims process in order to assure them of uniformity, it would
have expressly stated so.
C.

Effect of Regulations on Preemption Finding

The Rini court cited the existence of regulations governing the
claims process as guiding its inference that Congress intended to
preempt all state law claims related to the loss or damage of
goods.1IO However, the existence of even extensive regulations do
not support a conclusion that state law remedies are preempted. Ill
Again, intent is the touchstone of the preemption analysis.1 12 The
presumption against preemption is strengthened when the federal
regulations and state law supplement each other to accomplish the
same purpose.113 Here, enforcement of the federal regulations and
state law both seek to promote fairness in the claims process, and
thus complement, rather than conflict with, each other.
employer could "retaliate against a nuclear whistle-blower by hiring thugs to assault the
employee on the job" without being answerable to state law).
108. 234 U.S. 412 (1914).
109. See id. at 421-22; see also A.T. Clayton & Co. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
R.R., 901 F.2d 833, 835 (10th Cir. 1990).
110. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 505 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 51 (1997).
111. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 498-500; English, 496 U.S. at 87 (1990).
112. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
113. See Tousley v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 752 F.2d 96, 102-03 (4th Cir.
1985).
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Examination of the Interstate Commerce Commission regula
tions covering the claims process demonstrates that they do not
have a preemptive effect on state law. The regulations include
some basic procedural aspects of the claims process. For instance, a
claim must be in writing, the carrier must establish individual claims
files, and the carrier must pay, decline to payor make a compro
mise settlement within a specified amount of time. 1l4 These regula
tions are, in all respects, completely compatible with the
requirements of Massachusetts law.1l5
Another strong consideration in the preemption analysis is an
agency's own approach to the preemptive effect of its regulations.
[B]ecause agencies normally address problems in a detailed man
ner and can speak through a variety of means, ... we can expect
that they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their
regulations to be exclusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to
the question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying that the
mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt.1l6

The claims process regulations, which were passed in 1972, are
silent on the issue of preemption. The ICC did not state any inten
tion to preempt state law in its introductory statement to the new
regulations. 1l7 The failure to speak on the subject reflects that the
ICC did not intend the regulations to have a preemptive effect.
Moreover, it is not dispositive on the issue of preemption that
the ICC had the authority to sanction carriers who violate the regu
lations. The existence of these powers does not oust all potential
state law remedies. State law claims and federal enforcement pow
ers are presumed to exist side by side.1 18
III.

CONCLUSION

The view of Carmack preemption taken by the Rini court ap
pears inconsistent with the general principles of preemption, as ap
114. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1005 (1997).
115. Interestingly, little of the conduct viewed by the Rini trial court judge as
"egregious" and "unfair" is specifically addressed by the regulations, which belies a
construction of the regulations as comprehensive. See supra notes 1-16 and accompa
nying text for a discussion of United's behavior and the trial court's ruling.
116. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987)
(quoting Hillsbourough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718
(1985)).
117. See 37 Fed. Reg. 4257 (1972).
118. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 461 U.S. 238, 254 (1984).
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plied by the United States Supreme Court and by the First Circuit
itself in other preemption cases. It may be that the Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger 119 Court's statement in 1913 that "[a]lmost every
detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no
rational doubt that Congress intended to take possession of the sub
ject and supersede all state regulation with reference to it,"120 was
the death knell for all consumers seeking remedies against unscru
pulous interstate carriers for the future. Although the Adams Ex
press Co. Court surely was not considering the relationship between
the Carmack Amendment and consumer protection acts that would
be enacted many years later, this statement has created an impossi
ble barrier for those seeking an exception to federal preemption.
Unfortunately, because of this statement by a Court sitting
long ago, the moving industry has been able to exempt itself from
the requirements of good faith and fair dealing with its customers,
by asserting immunity from state law claims based on implicit pre
emption by the Carmack Amendment. Given the Supreme Court's
recent decision not to take certiorari in Rini, it is unlikely that this
problem will ever be resolved by judicial means.
Now what probably has always been the best means of exacting
fairness from the moving industry has become the only means.
Since consumers have no access to state law remedies designed to
protect them from unscrupulous businesses, Congress should act
quickly to insure more stringent regulation of the moving industry's
claims process practices and to provide consequences for violations
that have bite. Congress has a number of options available in this
regard. It could explicitly state that it does not intend to preempt
state law remedies and restore the ability of consumers to bring
state common law and statutory claims when they have been
wronged by interstate carriers in the course of settling a claim. Al
ternatively, Congress could create an administrative system, provid
ing consumers with a reasonably swift and effective means of
resolving their complaints against recalcitrant moving companies.
Regardless of the method chosen, the moving industry should not
be allowed to continue to ride roughshod over its customers, with
no consequence for any longer than the time it takes to pass such
legislation.

119.
120.

226 U.S. 491 (1913).
Id. at 505-06.

